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For the new round of WTO multilateral trade liberalisation negotiations to be 
successful, the world will need to be more enthusiastic and flexible about opening 
markets. Partisans will need to submerge their self-interests, and the U.S. will need to 
take the initiative for more open markets. This paper makes the case that only modest 
changes in the U.S. domestic grain, oilseed, and cotton programmes are needed for 
compatibility with global free trade. The Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform 
(FAIR) Act of 1996 and related policy changes in the 1990s brought fundamental reforms 
compatible with freer domestic and foreign markets.  Chief among these were a shift from 
coupled deficiency payments to decoupled direct payments, an end to supply 
management, and less engagement of government in commodity stock accumulation and 
export subsidies.  Converting commodity price support to recourse loans while ending all 
but administrative cost subsidies to crop insurance would go far to liberalise grain, 
oilseed, and cotton policies. Unilateral termination of commodity programmes including 
direct payments totalling 42 percent of net cash farm income in year 2000 would appear 
to be traumatic to producers. However, reduction of direct payments could be offset (for 
farm income) by rising farm commodity prices and receipts resulting from (1) less farm 
output attending lower loan rates and crop insurance subsidies, and (2) world farm 
commodity price-enhancement from freer global trade. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Global agricultural trade has stubbornly avoided multilateral liberalisation 
through bilateral Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act negotiations from 1934 to 1947, 
and seven rounds of General Agreement on Tariff and Trade multilateral agreements 
from 1947 through the Uruguay Round ending in 1994.  Now agricultural trade 
liberalisation stands in the way of broader trade liberalisation, which is useful if not 
essential to invigorate a moribund world economy. 
Key countries and regions retain “sacred cows” that they remain unwilling to 
sacrifice on the altar of free trade.  The European Union demands its precautionary 
and multifunctionality principles.  Canada wants to retain its wheat board and its 
dairy and poultry quota policies. East Asia insists on protecting domestic rice 
industries.  The United States demands environmental and social (labour) chapters as 
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strongly as developing countries (now dominating World Trade Organisation 
membership) oppose those chapters.  The U.S. also clings to dairy, sugar, peanut, 
and tobacco programmes that will be challenged in future WTO negotiations. 
If a new round of WTO multilateral trade liberalisation negotiations is to be 
successful, the world will need to be more enthusiastic and flexible about such 
negotiations than at present.  Today, the U.S.A. and the world are hostage to 
commodity-group and other special interests.  Partisans will need to submerge their 
self-interests to “jump-start” the faltering world economy. The U.S. probably will 
need to take the initiative with Congress’ providing trade promotion (fast-track) 
authority.  This paper makes the case that only modest changes in the U.S. domestic 
grain, oilseed, and cotton programmes are needed for global free trade compliance. 
Changes to comply with global free trade in dairy, tobacco, sugar, and peanut 
programmes will be more difficult for the U.S. but also could provide major national 
and international income (deadweight) gains. 
The U.S. and, indeed, worldwide domestic farm commodity programme 
policy and international trade policy are inseparable.  Liberalisation of domestic 
commodity programmes and international trade tend to go together, but with no clear 
order of causality.  Domestic MacSharry liberalisation of European Union domestic 
farm policy in 1992, and the 1985 and 1990 U.S. farm bills were precursors to a 
successful Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement (URAA) in 1994.  On the other 
hand, provision in the URAA for a 20 percent reduction in trade, distorting (amber 
box) programmes such as commodity price supports without production controls in 
developed countries by year 2000 while placing no limits on non-trade-distorting 
(green box) programmes such as decoupled direct payments, makes trade 
liberalisation a force for domestic farm policy liberalisation. 
Nonetheless, some distinctions remain between domestic and international 
policy liberalisation.  It is possible to have comprehensible unilateral domestic farm 
policy liberalisation without international policy liberalisation, as in the case of New 
Zealand, but it is more difficult to have comprehensive international trade policy 
liberalisation without domestic farm commodity policy liberalisation.  This paper 
addresses potential impacts of the United States’ unilateral versus multilateral trade 
and commodity programme liberalisation. First, however, I review the implications 
of domestic agricultural commodity programme liberalisation for the U.S. 
 
IMPACT OF 1996 FARM COMMODITY PROGRAMMES 
ON FARM OUTPUT AND RECEIPTS 
Table 1 contains estimates from various sources of the percentage increase in 
farm output (above competitive levels) induced by Production Flexibility Contract 
(PFC) payments, by marketing loan and loan deficiency payments, and by 
crop/revenue insurance subsidies. 
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Table 1 
Annual Loss of Farm Receipts and the Excess of Farm Output above Competitive 
Market Levels Induced by the 1996 Farm Bill, U.S., 1998–2000 
Contribution to Farm Output Loss in Farm Receiptsa 
Programme Feature Low High Short Run Intermediate Run 
 (Percent of Farm Output) ($ Billion) 
Direct Payments     
 0.15(W)    0.68 0.19 
  0.25(B)   1.13 0.32 
     
Price Supports Including Loan 
   Deficiency Payments 
 
 0.68(W)    3.07 0.88 
  1.38(W)   6.22 1.78 
     
Insurance Subsidies     
 0.28(W)    1.26 0.36 
  4.10(S) 18.48 5.28 
     
Total, All Sources     
      1.11    5.01 1.43 
        5.73 25.83 7.38 
Sources:  Interpreted from Westcott and Young (W); Burfisher, et al. (B); Skees (S). 
aProportional addition to output multiplied by gross receipts elasticity 1+1/E times 1998–2000 
farm receipts averaging $193.2 billion.  E is aggregate adjustment elasticity defined as the sum 
of demand and supply elasticities where short-run E= –0.3, intermediate run E= –0.6, and long 
run E= –1.0.  Because E= –1.0 in the long run, the receipt impact is zero. 
 
Direct Payments 
Direct government payments averaged $16 billion per year from 1998 to 2000 and 
were the principal farm income support instrument [U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(2001), p. 58].  The term “decoupled” implies that payments do not influence farm 
pricing, output, and trade.  In fact, no payment is purely decoupled.  Farmers are 
inevitably short of funds—either cash or loan collateral—to acquire more production 
inputs.  Payments lose that constraint and find their way into expanding production inputs 
and outputs.  Some farm programmes are far more decoupled from output than others, 
however, as is apparent in Table 1.  The estimates, indicating that direct payments added 
only 0.15 to 0.25 percent to farm output, are an important and reassuring finding, if 
correct.  The numbers imply that direct payments can be used to maintain domestic farm 
income without seriously distorting domestic output or international trade.  Direct 
payment transfers to farmers far exceeded the $1 billion reduction in farm receipts caused 
by programme-induced expansion in farm production.  We note later, however, that 
considerable national income was lost from distortions in national savings and 
investments resulting from additional taxes used to provide payments. 
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Marketing Loans and Deficiency Payments 
Even a loan support price set below the average market price distorts 
production because the anticipated or expected (mean) commodity price (on which 
producers make production decisions) is raised when the lower part of the price 
distribution is removed.  Loan rates for crops under the 1996 Farm Bill are well 
above operating costs of production, hence supports induce farmers to produce 
because operating costs will surely be covered.  In some cases, as in soybeans, loan 
rates are above total unit cost (including land and overhead expenses) of production 
on efficient commercial farms.  Hence loan supports distort production and trade as 
compared to production and trade in well-functioning competitive markets. 
Westcott and Young (2000, p. 12) estimate that incentives embodied in marketing 
loan and loan deficiency payments added 4-5 million acres to crop production.  The 
high estimate in Table 1 assumes that acres added are as productive as average crop 
land and that all crop and livestock production depends ultimately on crop 
production, hence production is increased by 4.5 million acres on 325 million acres 
of crop land or by (4.5/325) or 1.38 percent.  The lower estimate of 0.68 percent 
added output adjusts for possible lower productivity of added acres and for resources 
beyond crops required to produce livestock.  This lower estimate in Table 1 
recognises that livestock can be produced from grass and imported feeds as well as 
from domestic crops. 
In the 1990s, the government shifted from non-recourse loan rate supports 
(which tended to hold market prices at the loan support rate) to marketing loans that 
provided payments to farmers on the shortfall of market prices below the loan 
support rate.  The former non-recourse loan programme was faulted for holding 
prices at high levels that provided an umbrella under which our export competitors 
produced and sold to take over our world export markets.  In contrast, the marketing 
loan programme has been faulted for dumping our commodities in world markets at 
subsidised prices below production costs.  Either type of loan support distorts 
markets by generating excess production.  
An alternative would be a recourse loan that farmers could obtain from 
government for the loan rate value of a commodity at harvest but which would have 
to be repaid at full loan value plus interest before the next harvest.  A recourse loan 
would enable operators to avoid selling on a glutted harvest market and relieve cash-
flow pressures without distorting market incentives.  A recourse loan that would 
have to be repaid in cash at face value would distort domestic and international 
markets, but less than either a marketing or non-recourse loan.  A recourse loan 
could sharply reduce the $3 to $6 billion loss in farm receipts induced by excess 
output from price supports (Table 1).  
An alternative would be to reduce loan rates to cover only variable costs of 
production. If additional countercyclical payments are deemed to be politically 
essential, the “old” loan rate could be made a target price, and a deficiency payment 
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paid on the shortfall of the loan rate (or market price, if above the loan rate) below 
the target price multiplied by a historical “decoupled” programme acreage and yield. 
 
Insurance Subsidies 
In year 2000, crop and revenue insurance subsidies totalled approximately 
$2.5 billion and accounted for 60 percent of crop revenue insurance cost, 
encouraging output.  The nation gets more of what it pays for with insurance 
subsidies—risk.  Crop risk is especially great in the Plains states. Thus it is no 
surprise that Jerry Skees finds the contribution of insurance subsidies to crop acreage 
harvested especially large in the Great Plains states such as Texas and North Dakota.  
Crop and revenue insurance loss ratios (programme costs for indemnity payments 
and administration relative to premiums paid by farmers) averaged 1.88 for the U.S. 
from 1981 to 1999, and averaged over 2.0 in several states including Arkansas 
(2.97), Texas (2.72), Georgia (2.68), North Carolina (2.40), and North Dakota (2.16). 
Crop and revenue insurance causes more land to be in crops, and causes land 
to be cropped more intensively.  For example, risky corn may be planted in place of 
less risky grain sorghum in the semi-arid Plains because a high corn yield will earn 
more than grain sorghum and a low corn yield will “earn” an insurance payment.  
Insurance subsidies hold land in crops that otherwise would be unprofitable to farm 
and would revert to grassland or forest.  The land is not only marginal for farming; it 
also may be environmentally fragile, and prone to wind and water erosion.  Westcott 
and Young (2000, p. 12) estimated that crop and revenue insurance premium 
subsidies have added approximately 900,000 acres to aggregate plantings of eight 
major crops.  This translates into a 0.28 percent increase in farm output (Table 1). 
Jerry Skees estimated that crop and revenue insurance subsidies have added 
25–30 million acres of crops in the U.S.—an area nearly as large as that enrolled in 
the Conservation Reserve Programme (CRP), and about one-tenth of total cropland 
harvested in the nation.  The high estimate in Table 1 assumes that 25 million crop 
acres are added by insurance subsidies and that they are only as productive as CRP 
acres—about half the productivity of an average acre cropped [see Tweeten (1989), 
p. 350].  Thus, insurance subsidies add as much as 4.1 percent to farm output.  This 
added output in turn reduced farm receipts by up to $26 billion, offsetting benefits of 
all government payments to farmers.  Thus use of insurance subsidies as a “Trojan 
horse” to provide direct payments to farmers not only distorts international trade—it 
also may offset much of the intended income benefits of commodity programmes for 
U.S. farmers. 
 
Total Impact 
Excessive output and resources committed to farming cost the nation $0.93 
billion in lost income based on the average, 3.4 percent, between the low (1.11 
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percent) and high (5.73 percent) estimate of excessive production in Table 1.1  The 
national income (deadweight) loss is $2.64 billion with the high estimate.  This 
average for 1998-2000 is not much less in real terms than the cost of commodity 
programme distortions in the 1960s and 1980s. 
Each $100 of tax dollars providing payments to producers reduces national 
income by approximately $15 due to distortions in saving and investment allocations 
[Ballard, et al. (1985)].  Adding this previously uncounted annual loss from tax 
distortion ($3.0 billion), and cost of administrative and lobbying resources (about $2 
billion that could have been better used elsewhere), and the total loss in national 
income is $5.93 billion based on 3.4 percent excess output in grains, oilseeds, and 
cotton only. National income loss of $600 million from peanut, tobacco, sugar, and 
dairy programmes [Tweeten, et al. (1997)] brings the total to $6.53 billion, or 3 
percent of farm receipts [see Council of Economic Advisors (1987), p. 159 for cost 
in (1985)].  
Several other observations follow from estimates in Table 1: 
• Additions to output reduced farm receipts from $5.01 billion to $25.83 
billion in the short run of 1-2 years, and by $1.43 billion to $7.38 billion in 
an intermediate run of 3-4 years.  The impact on farm receipts is negligible 
in the long run because farm aggregate demand is near unitary elasticity. 
• Termination of grain, oilseed, and cotton commodity programmes might not 
reduce aggregate farm income.  Less production attending termination of 
programmes could raise farm commodity prices and gross farm receipts to 
compensate for the loss of government payments, which totalled $23.3 
billion in year 2000.  This number is less than the “high” estimate of $25.8 
billion added to farm receipts in the short run from termination of the 1996 
farm bill production incentives. 
• Most of the excess output under the 1996 farm bill comes from excessive 
loan rates and (especially) from insurance subsidies.  These production 
incentives lower farm prices and receipts while raising costs, creating 
pressure to return to supply management programmes [Schnittker (2001), 
pp. 93–98].  Because sizable direct payments induce relatively little excess 
output, it follows that direct payments could be set as deemed necessary to 
maintain desired farm income after terminating loan rates (or shifting to 
recourse loans or lowering loan rates to cover only variable production 
costs) and insurance subsidies that distort farm resource allocation.  Thus 
 
1The formula is 
2
 115. ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ∆
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
β−α= q
qRDW  where DW is deadweight cost in $ billion, R = 
$193.2 billion farm receipts, α = intermediate-run supply elasticity of 0.2, β is intermediate-run demand 
elasticity of –0.3, and ∆q/q = 0.034 is the addition to output as measured by an average of the high and 
low estimate in Table 1 of excess farm output induced by programmes. 
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liberalisation of domestic and export markets potentially could make no 
group worse off but make the public better off while being supportive of the 
World Trade Organisation “green box” rules for non-distorted trade. 
Transition payments could buffer adjustments.  But, that scheme didn’t 
work in the 1996 farm bill. And if maintained too long, transition payments 
could unduly inflate land prices and rents. Also, an extended period of 
direct payments to farmers would lose substantial national income. 
 
New Programme Directions 
In July 2001, the House Agriculture Committee of the U.S. Congress proposed a 
countercyclical programme patterned after the pre-1996 target price-deficiency 
payment programme.  A payment would be paid to producers based on the shortfall of 
the market price below the target price multiplied by programme yield and acreage.  
The payment depends on market price and programme acreage and yield.  Programme 
acreage is updated to recent levels.  Programme yield is fixed at 1980s levels but 
producers may anticipate that such yields also will be updated based on recent yields.  
Thus farmers feel the need to maintain or expand their production base.  It follows that 
loan deficiency payments are likely to be classified as amber box (market and trade 
distorting) programmes potentially constituting an impediment to further trade 
liberalisation in a situation where the World Trade Organisation could call for a 
considerable phase-down or phase-out of amber box programmes.2 
Programme benefits from commodity loan rate supports, fixed payments, and 
countercyclical payments are all coupled to the farm and influence land prices.  
Hence farm owners and renters have reason to maintain high programme yields and 
acreages to maximise programme economic benefits and, hence, land values. If 
proposed generous programmes would be coupled, the U.S. could exceed the WTO 
amber box limits, and could create commodity surpluses that would return the U.S. 
to supply management programmes.   
Commodity programmes that restrict deficiency payments on production to 85 
percent of historic “programme” yield and production would appear to be somewhat 
decoupled because producers receive only the higher of the market price or loan rate 
for another unit of production.  However, farmers are aware that they must strive for 
ever higher current yields and acreages of crops because at some time in the future 
historic programme yields and acreages will be updated. Also, PFC payments, 
emergency market loss assistance, and related “decoupled” payments (presumably 
 
2According to Young, et al. the U.S. was utilising only 45 percent of its WTO-permitted AMS 
ceiling, but Hart and Babcock (2001, p. 3) estimated that the ceiling was exceeded in 1999 and 2000.  
Emergency supplemental assistance payments may be classified as amber box because they were provided 
by Congress to offset low farm prices.  They signal to producers that some minimal level of returns are 
assured, hence farmers can produce with assurance that an economic safety net will avoid penalty of low 
economic returns.  Another successful WTO multilateral trade agreement would reduce amber box 
programmes (Aggregate Measure of Support or AMS) by another 20 percent or more. 
Luther G. Tweeten 96
independent of prices and production) in fact are coupled—to the land.  The operator 
does not retain payments if he/she leaves the land.  For that reason, commodity 
programmes tend to keep farms in crops (rather than shifting land to grazing and 
forest), and programme benefits are capitalised into rents and land prices. 
As benefits of commodity programmes or trade liberalisation are bid into rents 
and land prices, the most rapid farm redistribution of income and wealth is from 
renters to landowners.  Rented land accounted for 45 percent of farmland in 1999 
[U.S. Department of Agriculture (2001), p. 23].  A majority of land is farmed by 
operators who rent-in at least part of their land.  A survey of professional farm 
managers indicated that PFC payments were almost immediately captured by 
landowners and reflected in rental rates and land values [U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (2001), p. 23].  Expected future benefits from government payments 
accounted for 11 percent of land value in 1990–97 and 25 percent of land value in 
1998–2001 [U.S. Department of Agriculture (2001), p. 25]. 
Results indicated that an end to government payments would reduce crop land 
values by 15–20 percent in the nation but by up to 69 percent in Northern Plains—an 
area that has relied heavily on such payments for income. It follows that even if 
aggregate net farm income were as high or higher with liberalised trade, and with an 
end to reliance on current loan deficiency payments, insurance subsidies, and output-
increasing incentives of direct payments that reduce farm income, some regions such 
as the Plains and Southeast would be worse off. Considerable marginal land in such 
regions would be shifted to grass and trees. 
The federal government in a bidding war between Democratic and Republican 
parties for control of Congress and the Presidency have elevated income of farm 
households to successive all-time records in each of the years 1996-2001 [U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (2001), p. 25].  Benefits are quickly being lost to renters 
and new landowners through increased output and capitalisation.  Government is 
creating a culture of dependency of farmers on taxpayers.  Farmers contend they 
must have government subsidies because farm receipts are low, but an equally valid 
and unstated conclusion is that receipts are low because government subsidies raise 
output and lower receipts.  Farmers will not easily be able to descend from the high 
income pedestal on which government has placed them without serious financial 
injury.  The injury could be less if cushioned by rising world commodity prices 
under trade liberalisation, as noted in the next section. 
 
GAINS FROM ENDING AGRICULTURAL TRADE DISTORTIONS 
The U.S. has much to gain from multilateral freer trade in agriculture in part 
because our agricultural tariffs average 12 percent as compared to an industrial-
country average of approximately 45 percent [Burfisher (2001), p. 10].  Agricultural 
product tariffs of our major farm markets average much higher: Canada 24 percent, 
the EU 21 percent, and Japan 33 percent [Wainio, et al. (2001)]. 
U.S. Farm Programmes under a Freer Trade Environment 97
As shown in Table 2, agricultural market distortions such as tariffs and subsidies 
reduce world agricultural prices by approximately 12 percent and reduce global real 
income by $31 billion in the short run, and to $56 billion in the long run—the latter 
accounting for cumulative benefits from greater savings, investment, and productivity 
[Diao, et al. (2001)].  Estimated benefits to the U.S. from agricultural free trade totalling 
$6.6 billion in the short-run (static) scenario constitute 21 percent of global benefits.  
Benefits to the U.S. in the long run—recognising direct and indirect impacts on saving, 
investment, and productivity—total $13.3 billion in the 15th year after liberalisation, or 
24 percent of world benefits.  If annual benefits of that level are maintained in perpetuity 
and discounted at 5 percent, the present value of all future benefits of free agricultural 
trade total $266 billion to the U.S. and $1.13 trillion to the world. 
 
Table 2 
Annual Welfare Impacts from Elimination of Global 
Agricultural Tariffs and Subsidies 
 
Static Resource 
Allocation Gainsa 
Static Plus Dynamic Benefits 
from Investment Growth Plus 
Productivity Gainsb 
 (Billion 1997 US Dollars) 
World 31.1 56.4 
Developed Country Group 28.5 35.2 
Australia and New Zealand   1.6   3.5 
Canada   0.8   1.4 
EFTA   1.7   0.2 
European Union   9.3 10.6 
Japan and Korea   8.6   6.2 
United States   6.6 13.3 
Emerging and Developing 
Country Group   2.6 21.3 
China   0.4   2.2 
Latin America   3.7   6.1 
Mexico –0.2   1.6 
Other Asian Countries   1.5   5.1 
South African Countries   0.3   0.8 
Rest of the World –3.1   5.4 
Source: Diao, et al. (2001). 
aStatic gains refer to the annual gains due to removing distortions to production and consumption 
decisions. 
bDynamic gains include effects related to cumulative increases in savings, investment, and 
productivity over a 15-year post-reform period.  Dynamic welfare impacts are the annual level 
about 15 years after reform. 
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Although a few developing countries are worse off with trade because they are 
food importers who will pay higher prices for imports with liberalisation, gains far 
exceed losses for most countries.  Thus the foundation for an agreement providing 
freer trade appears to exist (Table 2). 
A general rule is that the principal costs of trade distortions are borne by the 
countries that practice them [Tweeten (1992), p. 279].  This principle is supported by 
data in Table 3, indicating the impact on world agriculture commodity prices from 
eliminating policy distortions.  Distortions are divided into three types: (1) tariffs, (2) 
domestic supports such as price supports and supply management, and (3) export 
subsidies. 
Together, the EU and the U.S. accounted for 51 percent of the static and 42 
percent of the long-term dynamic potential gains from trade (Table 3).  The two 
entities together accounted for 52 percent of the world price distortions, noted in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Effects on World Agricultural Prices of Eliminating Agricultural Policy 
Distortions, by Country and Policy 
Elimination of: Worlda U.S. EU 
Japan/ 
Korea LDCs 
 (Percent Change from Base Price) 
All Policies 11.6 1.8 4.4 1.5 2.3 
Tariffs   6.0 0.7 1.5 1.4 2.3 
Domestic Support   3.6 0.9 2.0 0.2 b 
Export Support   1.5 0.1 0.9 b 0.0 
Source: Diao, et al. (2001). 
aNumbers do not sum to row and column totals because only selected countries are included and 
there are interactions among policies. 
bNot applicable, no policy in use. 
 
Multilateral market liberalisation, according to Diao, et al. (2001) potentially 
could raise world agricultural trade prices by 11.6 percent, of which over half comes 
from eliminating tariffs (especially used by importers, notably in developing 
countries), nearly one-third comes from eliminating domestic supports especially 
prominent (80 percent) in the U.S. and the EU, and nearly one-sixth comes from 
ending export subsidies especially prominent in the EU (Table 3). 
In the long-run, full liberalisation could increase the real value of U.S. 
agricultural exports by 19 percent, and agricultural imports by 9 percent, according 
to Burfisher (2001, p. 7.). Hence, it would markedly improve the nation’s balance of 
payments.  At issue is how such gains would be divided. 
Table 4 from Diao, et al. (2001) shows estimated gains in world prices by 
commodity, resulting from elimination of all policy distortions.  Gains for wheat (18.1 
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percent), other grains (except rice, 15.2 percent), sugar (16.4 percent), and livestock 
products (22.3 percent) exceed the world price average gain of 11.6 percent. Gains are 
especially large for sugar and livestock prices with global tariff removal, and in wheat 
and other grains with developed country (OECD) subsidy removal.  Gains are less for 
individual commodities from global export subsidy removal. 
It is apparent from Table 4 that all U.S. major crops (except fruits and 
vegetables) and livestock could benefit from higher world prices associated with 
multilateral trade and commodity programme liberalisation.  Other things being 
equal, an 11.6 percent increase in the price of agricultural commodities would raise 
farming receipts, averaging $193.2 billion annually for 1998-2000, by $22.4 billion. 
In the same three-year period, that potential gain exceeds the annual value of all 
direct payments (including loan deficiency payments) averaging $16.0 billion, or 
Commodity Credit Corporation outlays averaging $20.5 billion [U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (2001), p. 58]. 
 
Table 4 
Increase in World Prices Resulting from the Elimination of All Policy 
Distortions, By Commodity and Policy 
Commodity 
Full Policy 
Elimination 
Global Tariff 
Removal 
OECD 
Domestic 
Subsidy 
Removal 
Global 
Export 
Subsidy 
Removal 
 (Percent) 
Wheat 18.1   3.4 12.0 2.0 
Rice 10.1   5.9 2.4 1.5 
Other Grains 15.2   1.4 12.2 0.6 
Vegetables and Fruits   8.2   4.9 –0.1 3.0 
Oil and Oilseeds 11.2   3.1 7.8 0.1 
Sugar 16.4 10.9 1.6 3.3 
Other Crops   5.6   4.2 1.2 0.1 
Livestock and Products 22.3 12.2 5.5 3.1 
Processed Foods   7.6   4.8 1.8 1.0 
Source: Diao, et al. (2001). 
 
It is apparent that the economic gains to U.S. farmers from home (see Table 1) 
and abroad potentially could compensate producers for government payment losses 
from commodity programme (and trade) liberalisation.  But other farm problems 
such as economic instability would remain and might intensify. 
I have contended that instability arising from markets, governments, and 
nature is the major economic problem facing commercial agriculture.  Based on 
estimates individually for feed grains, soybeans, wheat, and aggregate farm output 
since 1950 in the United States, the coefficients of variation by decades and 
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commodities were greater for exports than for domestic utilisation or for production 
[Tweeten (1999)].  However, system variation as measured by the variation in stock 
requirement came mainly from domestic production and utilisation because 
quantities of the latter two sources of variation dominated export quantities.  For 16 
of 20 situations (four commodities, each for five decades), exports were positively 
correlated with domestic production. It follows that exports typically helped to 
dispose of a large domestic supply and hence to stabilise commodity prices.  In only 
2 of the 20 cases did exports overshadow domestic utilisation and production as 
sources of variation in the commodity market system [Tweeten (1999)]. 
 
OTHER ISSUES 
This final section notes a fundamental difference between the impact of trade 
liberalisation on U.S. farmers under the (1) pre-1996 and (2) post-1996 farm bill 
provisions. Prior to the 1996 farm bill that ended the set-asides, the farmer depended 
heavily on supply restrictions to raise commodity prices and incomes.  Excess production 
capacity removed from markets by government averaged about 6 percent of farm output 
in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1980s [see Tweeten (1989)].  Thus liberalisation of 
international trade and commodity programmes under the pre-1996 policies would 
reduce farm receipts and government payments more than would farm receipts rise with 
higher world prices (see Table 5).  However, because overall net gains to the U.S. public 
were a positive $4 billion per year, consumers and taxpayers potentially could 
compensate U.S. farmers to make all parties (consumers, farmers, taxpayers) better off.3 
The situation is quite different under the 1996-type farm bill as noted earlier. 
Because farm output exceeds rather than falls short of competitive equilibrium 
output, it follows that trade liberalisation attended by an end to trade-distorting 
domestic commodity programmes raises rather than reduces farm receipts as output 
falls with an inelastic demand in the short run.  Thus the 1996 farm bill places the 
U.S. in a better position to promote freer trade without damaging farm income. And 
if financial assistance to farmers is needed during a transition to freer trade, direct 
payments as under the 1996 bill are more acceptable to the WTO than are the pre-
1996 programme instruments to assist farmers. 
A final issue considered in this analysis is the difference in benefits to the U.S. 
farmers and the public at large for the U.S. only (unilateral) versus global 
(multilateral) trade liberalisation.  For lack of comprehensive recent results, the 
economic implications of unilateral and multilateral agricultural trade liberalisation 
are shown for the U.S. and other entities for 1989 (Table 5).  It is widely conceded 
that the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations brought considerable reform (shift 
from non-tariff barriers to tariffs) but little trade liberalisation.  Some reforms such as 
an end to U.S. set-asides and large export subsidies since 1989 distort some numbers in  
 
3Includes only static, first-round gains. Consideration of all indirect benefits could nearly double 
the static benefits according to the results in Table 2. 
Table 5 
Annual Benefits from Trade Liberalisation, Late 1980s a 
Unilateral Liberalisation Multilateral Liberalisation 
Country or Regionb PS CS GS NB PS CS GS NB 
 ($ Million) 
Australia –133 –3 150 14 581 –361 150 370 
Canada –1,533 75 1,812 354 –617 –703 1,812 492 
EC –15,280 15,808 4,069 4,597 –12,337 12,162 4,069 3,894 
Japan –14,080 16,418 2,263 4,601 –13,292 14,154 2,263 3,125 
U.S. –11,434 763 13,392 2,721 –7,642 –3,167 13,392 2,583 
W. Europe (Non-EC) –3,057 3,576 269 788 –2,567 2,881 269 583 
Source: Makki, et al. (1994, p. 24). 
aPS, producer surplus; CS, consumer surplus; GS, government savings; and NB, net benefits (PS + CS + GS).  These latter net benefits underestimate total 
deadweight gains from liberalisation because they do not include indirect effects and savings from reduced lobbying and programme administration. 
bAll world countries were included in the trade model used to calculate Table 5.  To save space, however, only the major traders’ results are reported. 
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Table 5 when applied to the conditions in year 2001.  In particular, as noted earlier, 
liberalisation benefits to U.S. consumers would be less, and to taxpayers and 
producers more, under the 1996 farm bill.  Nonetheless, the direction if not the 
magnitudes in Table 5 provide a useful point of departure for examining the impact 
of unilateral versus multilateral liberalisation of farm markets in the 21st century. 
Some notable conclusions from Table 5, many consistent with the results 
reported earlier in this paper, are as follows: 
• All major countries, regions, and the world gain under either unilateral or 
multilateral trade (and commodity programme) liberalisation. Net benefits 
(NB) are comprised of producer surplus (PS), plus consumer surplus (CS), 
plus government (taxpayer) surplus (GS). 
• Net gains (NB) from unilateral and multilateral liberalisation tend to be 
about equally large. Large countries or regions with major trade/ 
commodity programme distortions tend to gain the most from unilateral 
liberalisation, whereas countries or regions with relatively few price 
distortions and relatively large agricultural sectors tend to gain the most 
from multilateral liberalisation.  Rodney Tyers and Kym Anderson also 
show that unilateral liberalisation benefits liberalising countries although 
multilateral liberalisation benefits domestic producers more [see World 
Bank (1986), pp. 128–131]. 
• For every country or region, producers gain more (or lose less) from 
multilateral than from unilateral liberalisation (Table 5).  Thus producers 
have a major stake in the success of multilateral liberalisation. 
• Producers in most countries receive more income with no liberalisation than 
with unilateral or multilateral liberalisation.  Consumers far outnumber 
producers in every country, hence the losses per producer tend to be larger 
than gains per consumer with liberalisation.  Each producer as a big loser is 
motivated to organise with others for political action, to stop reform.  Those 
producers tend to be more than a match for large numbers of complacent 
consumers in the political arena, even though overall gains to consumers far 
exceed the losses to producers from liberalisation.  Thus market distortions 
remain because they benefit producers; but consumers, taxpayers, and the 
public at large tend to be better off with unilateral or multilateral 
liberalisation. As pointed out earlier, the situation has changed since 1996, 
so that American farmers can gain directly from freer trade, especially if 
provided adjustment assistance during a transition period. 
• Compensation by taxpayers and consumers for losses to producers can help 
to resolve the welfare-reducing strategic behaviour of producers described 
above.  Given the net economic benefits (deadweight gains) available from 
liberalisation, decoupled direct payments can be provided to producers to 
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make them as well off, or better off, with liberalisation rather than without, 
while leaving a net benefit for the rest of the society. 
• Compensation to producers may be essential to negotiate more liberal trade 
and commodity policy in the short and intermediate run (the latter shown in 
Table 5). Payments cannot be justified in the long run, however. One reason 
is that government (taxpayers) and consumers are only withdrawing the 
previous good fortune (income support) they generously bestowed on 
producers. A second reason is that gains from protection are lost to 
producers anyway, in the long run.  They are lost through a strong supply-
response-increasing-output and lowering price, a demand response causing 
substitution of products for the protected product, and, finally, the bidding 
of programme benefits into land values, rents, or production quotas.  Thus 
benefits of programmes are lost to renters and the new generation of 
landowners. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 and 
related policy changes in the 1990s brought fundamental reforms compatible with 
freer domestic and foreign markets.  Chief among these were a shift from coupled 
deficiency payments to decoupled Production Flexibility Contract payments, an end 
to set-aside (supply management), and less engagement of government in commodity 
stock accumulation and export subsidies.  These moves were consistent with the 
WTO “green box” freer trade policy. 
Unfortunately, measures also were taken in FAIR and subsequent legislation 
that added to “amber box” outlays and, indeed, threatened the Uruguay Round 
commitment to reduce trade-distorting policies. Converting commodity price support 
to recourse loans while ending all but administrative cost subsidies to crop insurance 
would go far to liberalise grain, oilseed, and cotton policies.  Shifting dairy, peanut, 
sugar, and tobacco to similar programmes would further position the U.S. farm 
policy for free trade. 
Unilateral or multilateral liberalisation of trade could be attended by an end to 
U.S. commodity programmes or, more likely, by a shift to decoupled payments.  The 
1996 FAIR Act provides a convenient platform of direct payments that can be targeted 
as deemed necessary to cushion adjustments of farmers to freer domestic and 
international markets. Unilateral termination of commodity programmes including 
direct payments totalling $23 billion, or 42 percent of net cash farm income in year 
2000 [U.S. Department of Agriculture (2001), p. 55], would appear to be traumatic to 
producers. However, reduction of transition payments could be offset (for farm 
income) by rising farm commodity prices and receipts resulting from (1) less farm 
output attending lower loan rates and crop insurance subsidies, and (2) world farm 
commodity price-enhancement from freer global trade.   
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It is tempting to return to target-price deficiency payment schemes to provide 
countercyclical support to farmers. A problem is that such supports would encourage 
farm production when the market is telling farmers to produce less. Another problem 
is that such support could increase instability in net farm income.  Net income rather 
than price is the “bottom line” for farmers.  Low farm prices tend to attend high farm 
output, providing the “self-insurance” of more stable farm receipts.  Thus the 
unintended consequence of stabilising prices “countercyclically” could be to increase 
variation in gross and net farm income as well as to provide incentives for excessive 
output and thereby a return to supply management. 
Most small farmers rely on off-farm income to alleviate the severe economic 
instability problem in agriculture. Large farmers can afford to deal with risk using 
the plethora of private risk management tools available to them.  If public 
involvement in risk management is unavoidable, instability in agriculture can be 
dealt with at low taxpayer cost, using modest inducements (matching a portion of 
savings with subsidies) by government for farmers to accumulate income in 
favourable years for use in years of lower income.  The Internal Revenue Service 
could administer such a programme at low administrative cost.  Of course, other risk 
management subsidies would have to be ended if an IRA-type financial asset 
stabilisation plan is to bring order to a government risk management programme 
currently in disarray. 
Finally, environmental problems of agriculture have “public goods” properties 
that the market alone will not address.  The government has a long tradition of 
helping farmers deal with environmental problems through programmes such as the 
Natural Resources Conservation Service, the Wetlands and Conservation Reserve 
programmes, conservation compliance requirements, and the Environmental Quality 
Incentive Programme.  Such programmes could be strengthened—with reforms 
discussed elsewhere [Tweeten and Zulauf (1997)]. 
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